Could an attacker simply hack the system to rewrite the wallet policy and remove the human signers?

Structurally impossible. By design, a wallet policy configuration is cryptographically locked directly inside the hardware.

A policy cannot be altered, bypassed, or recovered unless the modification request itself is explicitly signed and authorized by the designated admin quorum of administrators for that specific wallet. A cloud-hosted microservice like TCSS holds zero administrative rights to alter these hardware-enforced configuration states.

Core Takeaway: The TrustVault Co-Signing Service (TCSS) handles upfront, automated address book checking. The physical HSM firmware enforces the total key policy. A compromised TCSS can blindly offer its own signature, but it can never forge the physical human keys or the admin signatures required by the hardware to move funds outside the platform.

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